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The domain of quantification is to contain every possible world and everything in every world. The primitives are to be understood according to their English readings and the following postulates: P1: VxVy(Ixy n Wy) (Nothing is in anything except a world) P2: VxVyVz (Ixy & Ixz . y = z) (Nothing is in two worlds) P3: VxVy(Cxy n 3zIxz) (Whatever is a counterpart is in a world) P4: VxVy(Cxy n 3zIyz) (Whatever has a counterpart is in a world) PS: VxVyVz(Ixy & Izy & Cxz .n x = z) (Nothing is a counterpart of anything else in its world) P6: VxVy(Ixy Cxx) (Anything in a world is a counterpart of itself) P7: 3x(Wx & Vy(Iyx 3 Ay)) (Some world contains all and only actual things) P8: 3xAx (Something is actual)
The world mentioned in P7 is unique, by P2 and P8. Let us abbreviate its description: @= -df xVy(Iyx -Ay) (the actual world) Unactualized possibles, things in worlds other than the actual world, have often been deemed "entia non grata",' largely because it is not clear when they are or are not identical. But identity literally understood is no problem for us. Within any one world, things of every category are individuated just as they are in the actual world; things in different worlds are never identical, by P2. The counterpart relation is our substitute for identity between things in different worlds.2 Where some would say that you are in several worlds, in which you have somewhat different properties and somewhat different things happen to you, I prefer to say that you are in the actual world and no other, but you have counterparts in several other worlds. Your counterparts resemble you closely in content and context in important respects. They.resemble you more closely than do the other things in their worlds. But they are not really you. For each of them is in his own world, and only you are here in the actual world. Indeed we might say, speaking casually, that your counter-1 W. V. Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1960), p. 245. 2 Yet with this substitute in use, it would not matter if some things were identical with their counterparts after all I P2 serves only to rule out avoidable problems of individuation.
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THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY It would not have been plausible to postulate that the counterpart relation was symmetric. Suppose x3 in world w3 is a sort of blend of you and your brother; x3 resembles both of you closely, far more closely than anything else in w3 resembles either one of you. So x: is your counterpart. But suppose also that the resemblance between X3 and your brother is far closer than that between x3 and you. If so, you are not a counterpart of X3.
It would not have been plausible to postulate that nothing in any world had more than one counterpart in any other world. Suppose X4. and X4b in world W4 are twins; both resemble you closely; both resemble you far more closely than anything else in W4 does; both resemble you equally. If so, both are your counterparts.
It would not have been plausible to postulate that no two things in any world had a common counterpart in any other world. Suppose you resemble both the twins X4a and X4b far more closely than anything else in the actual world does. If so, you are a counterpart of both.
It would not have been plausible to postulate that, for any two worlds, anything in one was a counterpart of something in the other. Suppose there is something x5 in world w5-say, Batman-which does not much resemble anything actual. If so, x5 is not a counterpart of anything in the actual world.
It would not have been plausible to postulate that, for any two worlds, anything in one had some counterpart in the other. Suppose whatever thing x6 in world w6 it is that resembles you more closely than anything else in w6 is nevertheless quite unlike you; nothing in wo resembles you at all closely. If so, you have no counterpart in w6.
II. TRANSLATION
Counterpart theory and quantified modal logic seem to have the same subject matter; seem to provide two rival ways of formalizing our modal discourse. In that case they should be intertranslatable; indeed they are. Hence I need not give directions for formalizing modal discourse directly by means of counterpart theory; I can assume the reader is accustomed to formalizing modal discourse by means of modal operators, so I need only give directions for translating sentences of quantified modal logic into sentences of counterpart theory.
Counterpart theory has at least three advantages over quantified modal logic as a vehicle for formalized discourse about modality. (1) Counterpart theory is a theory, not a special-purpose intensional logic. (2) Whereas the obscurity of quantified modal logic has proved intractable, that of counterpart theory is at least divided, if not conquered. We can trace it to its two independent sources. There is our uncertainty about analyticity, and, hence, about whether certain descriptions describe possible worlds; and there is our uncertainty about the relative importance of different respects of similarity and dissimilarity, and, hence, about which things are counterparts of which. (3) If the translation scheme I am about to propose is correct, every sentence of quantified modal logic has the same meaning as a sentence of counterpart theory, its translation; but not every sentence of counterpart theory is, or is equivalent to, the translation of any sentence of quantified modal logic. Therefore, starting with a fixed stock of predicates other than those of counterpart theory, we can say more by adding counterpart theory than we can by adding modal operators. Now let us examine my proposed translation scheme.11 We begin with some important special cases, leading up to a general definition. If the modal operator is not initial, we translate the subsentence it governs. And if there are quantifiers that do not lie within the scope of any modal operator, we must restrict their range to the domain of things in the actual world; for that is their range in quantified modal logic, whereas an unrestricted quantifier in counterpart theory would range at least over all the worlds and everything in any of them. A sentence of quantified modal logic that contains no modal operator-a nonmodal sentence in a modal context-is therefore 11NOTATION: Sentences are mentioned by means of the Greek letters 'g','',. . .; variables by means of 'a', 'a', 'y', 'A',... If 4, is any n-place sentence and a...a. are any n different variables, then a ..* a,, is the sentence obtained by substituting al uniformly for the alphabetically first free variable in 4b, a2 for the second, and so on. Variables introduced in translation are to be chosen in some systematic way that prevents confusion of bound variables. Symbolic expressions are used autonymously. I I8 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY translated simply by restricting its quantifiers to things in the actual world.
Finally, consider a sentence in which there are modal operators within the scopes of other modal operators. Then we must work inward; to obtain 4P from 4 we must not only restrict quantifiers in 4 but also translate any subsentences of q with initial modal operators.
The general translation scheme can best be presented as a direct definition of the translation of a sentence q5 of quantified modal logic: TI: The translation of 4) is 4)@ (4) holds in the actual world); that is, in primitive notation, 33 ( 
III. ESSENTIALISM
Quine has often warned us that by quantifying past modal operators we commit ourselves to the view that "an object, of itself and by whatever name or none, must be seen as having some of its traits necessarily and others contingently, despite the fact that the latter traits follow just as analytically from some ways of specifying the object as the former traits do from other ways of specifying it."13 This so-called "Aristotelian essentialism"-the doctrine of essences not relative to specifications-"should be every bit as congenial to [the champion of quantified modal logic] as quantified modal logic itself."14 Agreed. Essentialism is congenial. We do have a way of saying n If we also postulate that the counterpart relation is an equivalence relation, we get an interpretation like that of that an attribute is an essential attribute of an object--essential regardless of how the object happens to have been specified and regardless of whether the attribute follows analytically from any or all specifications of the object.
Consider the attribute expressed by a 1-place sentence 0 and the object denoted by a singular term15 ?. To say that this attribute is an essential attribute of this object is to assert the translation of oft.
But we have not yet considered how to translate a modal sentence containing a singular term. For we know that any singular term r may be treated as a description 7a (#a) (although often only by letting 4 contain some artificial predicate made from a proper name); and we know that any description may be eliminated by Russell's contextual definition. Our translation scheme did not take account of singular terms because they need never occur in the primitive notation of quantified modal logic. We must always eliminate singular terms before translating; afterwards, if we like, we can restore them.
There is just one hitch: before eliminating a description, we must assign it a scope. Different choices of scope will, in general, lead to nonequivalent translations. This is so even if the eliminated description denotes precisely one thing in the actual world and in every possible world.16
Taking r as a description 7a(Oa) and assigning it narrow scope, our sentence o430 is interpreted as This second auxiliary premise is not equivalent to the translation of any modal sentence.2" In general, of course, there will be more than two ways to assign scopes. Consider oo (vt). Each description may be given narrow, medium, or wide scope; so there are nine nonequivalent translations.
It is the wide-scope, de re, transparent translation of o4r which says that the attribute expressed by q is an essential attribute of the thing denoted by t. In short, an essential attribute of something is an attribute it shares with all its counterparts. All your counterparts are probably human; if so, you are essentially human. All your counterparts are even more probably corporeal; if so, you are essentially corporeal. An attribute that something shares with all its counterparts is an essential attribute of that thing, part of its essence. The whole of its essence is the intersection of its essential attributes, the attribute it shares with all and only its counterparts. (The attribute, because there is no need to distinguish attributes that are coextensive not only in the actual world but also in every possible world.) There may or may not be an open sentence that expresses the attribute that is the essence of something; to assert that the attribute expressed by q is the essence of the thing denoted by r is to assert aa(Ia@ & VS(1@S m. .@05 -5 = a) & V3Vy (Iyf3 m. Cya -4Ay))
(The actual world contains a unique a such that 0@a; and for anything y in any world ,, y is a counterpart of a if and only if 4Ay)
This sentence is not equivalent to the translation of any modal sentence. Essence and counterpart are interdefinable. We have just defined the essence of something as the attribute it shares with all and only 20 Cf. Hintikka, op. cit., pp. 138-155. its counterparts; a counterpart of something is anything having the attribute which is its essence. (This is not to say that that attribute is the counterpart's essence, or even an essential attribute of the counterpart.)
Perhaps there are certain attributes that can only be essential attributes of things, never accidents. Perhaps every human must be essentially human; more likely, perhaps everything corporeal must be essentially corporeal. The attribute expressed by 4 is of this sort, incapable of being an accident, just in case it is closed under the counterpart relation; that is, just in case We might wonder whether these attributes incapable of being accidents are what we call "natural kinds." But notice first that we must disregard the necessarily universal attribute, expressed, for instance, by the open sentence a = a, since it is an essential attribute of everything. And notice second that arbitrary unions of attributes incapable of being accidents are themselves attributes incapable of being accidents; so to exclude gerrymanders we must confine ourselves to minimal attributes incapable of being accidents. All of these may indeed be natural kinds; but these cannot be the only natural kinds, since some unions and all intersections of natural kinds are themselves natural kinds.
IV. MUODAL PRINCIPLES
Translation into counterpart theory can settle disputed questions in quantified modal logic. We can test a suggested modal principle by seeing whether its translation is a theorem of counterpart theory; or, if not, whether the extra postulates that would make it a theorem are plausible. We shall consider eight principles and find only one that should be accepted.
-3 o0 o (Becker's principle)
The translation is not a theorem unless 4 is a closed sentence, but would have been a theorem in general under the rejected postulate that the counterpart relation was transitive.
-3 3 oo (Brouwer's principle)
The translation is not a theorem unless 4 is a closed sentence, but would have been a theorem in general under the rejected postulate that the counterpart relation was symmetric. a, = a2 -3 QCal -a2 (a, and a2 not the same variable) The translation is not a theorem, but would have been under the rejected postulate that nothing in any world had more than one counterpart in any other world. a, $ a2 -3 OI # aa (a, and a2 not the same variable) The translation is not a theorem, but would have been under the rejected postulate that no two things in any world had a common counterpart in any other world.
Va c4oa -3 oVa4a (Barcan's principle)
The translation is not a theorem, but would have been under the rejected postulate that, for any two worlds, anything in one was a counterpart of something in the other.
aa.oa -3 a0a4a
The translation is not a theorem, but would have been under the rejected postulate that, for any two worlds, anything in one had some counterpart in the other. The characteristic relation gives the appropriate restriction: we are to consider only worlds i-related to whatever world we are in (and certain things in it). Necessity and possibility themselves are that pair of relative modalities whose characteristic relation is just the 2-place universal relation between worlds." We can easily extend our translation scheme to handle sentences containing miscellaneous modal operators. We will treat them just as we do necessity and possibility, except that quantifiers over worlds will range over only those worlds which bear the appropriate characteristic relation to some world and perhaps some things in it. The translation of 0 remains 0@ ; we need only add two new clauses to the recursive definition of q: 
